[ Le contrôle parlementaire comme vecteur de bonne gouvernance des finances publiques, outil de lutte contre l’impunité et d’adhésion populaire du citoyen à l’impôt en République Démocratique du Congo ]
Volume 20, Issue 4, July 2017, Pages 1210–1220
Richard KAKESA MALUNDANGU1
1 Chercheur, Chef de travaux, Doctorant en Sciences Politiques et Administratives, Université de Kinshasa, RD Congo
Original language: French
Copyright © 2017 ISSR Journals. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Parliaments are major pillards of democracy both in the voting of laws in general and fiscal in particular and in the implementation of control over public finances. The missions of parliamentary scrutiny emanate from the constitution and the internal regulation. In practice, it appears that these checks do not appear to be well carried out in Democratic Republic of the Congo because of their laxity. Consequently they accentuate the mismanagement and use of public funds by the managers and managers of public institutions, enterprises and institutions. As elected representatives of the people and models, they vote fiscal and budgetary laws and must also pay their professional taxes on remunerations. This pedagogical example must be followed by taxpaying citizens by adhering to the tax system. It unfortunately unfolds that the so-called «majority» deputies, despite the means of control they have, only aim to defend the interests of the ruling majority to the detriment of the general interest of the people and those called «the opposition» manage to bargain their motions. This aspect reduces the catalytic role of effective parliamentary oversight over public finances by expanding impunity, not consolidating good governance of public finances and economic development, let alone reducing poverty.
Author Keywords: Supervising power, financial resources, legislative check, national assembly, democracy, deputy.
Volume 20, Issue 4, July 2017, Pages 1210–1220
Richard KAKESA MALUNDANGU1
1 Chercheur, Chef de travaux, Doctorant en Sciences Politiques et Administratives, Université de Kinshasa, RD Congo
Original language: French
Copyright © 2017 ISSR Journals. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract
Parliaments are major pillards of democracy both in the voting of laws in general and fiscal in particular and in the implementation of control over public finances. The missions of parliamentary scrutiny emanate from the constitution and the internal regulation. In practice, it appears that these checks do not appear to be well carried out in Democratic Republic of the Congo because of their laxity. Consequently they accentuate the mismanagement and use of public funds by the managers and managers of public institutions, enterprises and institutions. As elected representatives of the people and models, they vote fiscal and budgetary laws and must also pay their professional taxes on remunerations. This pedagogical example must be followed by taxpaying citizens by adhering to the tax system. It unfortunately unfolds that the so-called «majority» deputies, despite the means of control they have, only aim to defend the interests of the ruling majority to the detriment of the general interest of the people and those called «the opposition» manage to bargain their motions. This aspect reduces the catalytic role of effective parliamentary oversight over public finances by expanding impunity, not consolidating good governance of public finances and economic development, let alone reducing poverty.
Author Keywords: Supervising power, financial resources, legislative check, national assembly, democracy, deputy.
Abstract: (french)
Les parlements sont des piliers majeurs de la démocratie aussi bien dans le vote des lois en général et fiscales en particulier que dans la mise en œuvre du contrôle sur les finances publiques. Les missions des contrôles parlementaires émanent de la constitution et des règlements intérieurs. Dans la pratique, il se dégage que ces contrôles effectués ne semblent pas être bien accomplis en République Démocratique du Congo à cause de leur laxisme. Par conséquent ils accentuent la mauvaise gestion et l’utilisation des deniers publics par les dirigeants et gestionnaires des institutions, entreprises et établissements publics. Entant qu’élus du peuple et modèles, ils votent des lois fiscales et budgétaires et doivent eux aussi payer leurs impôts professionnels sur les rémunérations. Cet exemple pédagogique doit être suivi par les citoyens contribuables en adhérant au système fiscal. Il se dégage malheureusement que les députés dits de la « majorité » malgré les moyens de contrôle qu’ils ont ne s’attèlent qu’à défendre les intérêts de la majorité au pouvoir au détriment de l’intérêt général du peuple et ceux dits de « l’opposition » arrivent à marchander leurs motions. Cet aspect des choses réduit le rôle catalyseur du contrôle parlementaire efficace sur les finances publiques en agrandissant l’impunité, ne consolide pas la bonne gouvernance des finances publiques et le développement économique, moins encore la réduction de la pauvreté.
Author Keywords: Pouvoir de contrôle, ressources fiscales, vérification législative, assemblée nationale, démocratie, député.
How to Cite this Article
Richard KAKESA MALUNDANGU, “Parliamentary control as a vehicle for good governance of public finances, a tool to fight against impunity and the citizen’s popular support for the tax in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” International Journal of Innovation and Applied Studies, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1210–1220, July 2017.
