This article provides an empirical assessment of the relationship between financial development and institutional quality, taking into account financial instability. This instability remains one of the first symptoms of the disorder of the financial system which implies the need to highlight warning indicators to assess the soundness of the financial system and identify policy measures to reduce the risk of financial instability. The assumption is that the instability of financial development increases with financial crises. Indeed, using a panel of 13 emerging countries and a period of 15 years from 1996 to 2011, we tried to detect the impact of various external macroeconomic factors and financial instability on financial understanding by the index financial stress (ISF). The construction of this index leads to the conclusion that besides the traditional elements of institutional quality of a country plays an important role in the intensity of stress. In other words, such an indicator is crucial in the early detection of financial crises. Moreover, econometric and quantitative analysis revealed that there is a significant negative correlation between the index of financial stress on the one hand and economic growth and institutional quality by other, while is positively correlated with banking regulations. Moreover, the analysis strongly rejected the assumption of homogeneity of data on the index of financial stress in our panel, and the suggestion of a heterogeneous random individual effect model.

The purpose of this article is, by using a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) applied to the case of Tunisia, to highlight the possible relationship of governance with economic growth. Indeed, considered as the way by which power is exercised in the management of economic and social resources of a country, several empirical studies have attempted to identify the relationship between the governance and the economic growth of a country. The majority of works were in the form of cross-section studies, without considering the time dimension. Similarly, the works usually based in the construction of the quality of the governance of a country on some components without taking into account all the qualities mentioned. Indeed, using a database of various official organizations, we have tried to build an aggregate indicator, supposedly apprehend the quality of Tunisian institutions. Certainly, it turned out from the various tests and investigations carried that a causal relationship exists between governance and economic growth. In other words, like the governance affects growth, the latter in turn has an effect on the quality of the institutions of the country.

The new configuration productive do not consider any more the space as a source of costs and as a passive support of productive factors but, it replaces it by the concept of territory, where its organization, its socio-economic and institutional characteristics, play an active role. This article aims to verify the hypothesis which assumes that the territory is a windfall for the productivity of the agglomerated companies. Indeed, by application to the Local Productive System (LPS) of Ksar-Hellal, it turned out that the specific resources of the territory can be in the service of agglomerated companies, but it is not necessary that they participate together in their productive efficiency, and in the institution of an endogenous dynamics of development. In addition, the analysis proved that social relationships play an unimportant role in the productive performances of the concentrated companies, putting into question the theoretical hypotheses, which consider the relevance of the role of the extraeconomic processes. Therefore, the assumption that all the specific resources of the country are responsible for the productivity of agglomerated firms should be allowed with some caution. There is no guarantee that the concentrated companies of LPS enjoy all the economic and social benefits of their territorial base. The agglomerated companies can take profit by exploiting their economic factors, while ignoring the informal aspects.

Until the eighties, Tunisia opted for a policy of import substitution and of protection of domestic market from foreign competition. Within this framework, the State controlled most of the economy such as: control of interest rates, price controls, maintaining an overvalued exchange rate, the maintenance of quantitative restrictions and tariffs high customs. In recent years, most developing countries, as Tunisia, adopt economic development strategies increasingly liberal and this by opening up their domestic markets to international trade. Indeed, the context in which the Tunisian economy is expected to move is difficult, and the challenge on its competitiveness is important. The analysis detected that Tunisia is succumbing to the foreign competition, which it faces on the world and European market. Indeed, we have revealed that Tunisian competitiveness is doped, especially, by the depreciation policy of the Tunisian Dinar and his compression policy of wages but, to a lesser extent, impelled by the real competitive potential to knowing the productivity gains. Consequently, and by the insignificant influence of structural component of the Tunisian competitiveness, it is primordial to revise its strategy of competitiveness, to be directed to the construction of a competitive potential, built on a durable basis, and un-doped by the exogenic measures, such the use of depreciation's weapon.