The objective of this paper is to show the constraints of the Moroccan tax system in a context marked by the suffering of public finances. Indeed, following the effects of the international financial crisis generating a decline in economic growth as the social movements that took place later in 2011 as part of what has been called the "Arab Spring", the public spending has increased dramatically especially following the weight of payroll and the load of the compensation system. In parallel, this increase in public spending has been accompanied by a reduction of public resources. The public receipts that come mainly from taxes are condemned by a lame tax system, unfair and derogatory. He is a lame tax system because he apprehends, at every opportunity, the concept of reform, to a reduction in rate, he is unfair because it is concentrated on a few categories of taxpayers and he is derogatory because it provides tax incentives sometimes unjustified for many sectors. Faced with this situation, budgetary balance cannot be achieved. The recourse to public borrowing remains a 'normal' solution chosen by the government. In fact, public debt weighs heavily on the general state budget. The burden of debt service which is up sharply continuous, has contributed to the deterioration of the budgetary balance. With the aim to reduce this structural budget deficit as opposed at cyclical deficit, it is important to proceed in real reforms concerning taxation, public subsidies system and the good governance of public finances.

Morocco signed a range of preferential agreements with more than fifty partners. However, the balance of trade with them, benefits to the partners of Morocco against the interests of Moroccan firms. Similarly, the conclusion of new trade agreements such as that with Canada or UEMOA will degrade the trade balance of Morocco and will worsen its deficit.
The present paper aims to show the problem of inconsistency between trade policy of Morocco and its sectoral policies: agricultural, industrial and fisheries; since for foreign trade policy, a tariff reform based on the reduction of tariffs was implemented while the effort to promote and diversify the industrial and agricultural supply has not received the same necessary logical care. The causes of incoherence relate in particular to the existence of a dislocated economic sector, disintegrated and weakly competitive. In other words, The lack of competitive firms, able to satisfy, at competitive rates, domestic demand, to able to satisfy, at competitive rates, domestic demand, to compete internationally, to create employment for young people and promote social progress. The existing mechanisms of action as sectoral plans implemented since a good ten years have failed to boost economic growth and to achieve the objectives of intended development.
The role of the state at this time should focus on two points: first to support financially businesses and second, to support the cost of poorly studied and less thoughtful trade openness. This is based mainly on free trade with powerful and competitive markets.

The rules of origin are justified by the need to regulate trade between two or a group of countries (trade policy mechanism). This paper proposes to study the impact of rules of origin on the implementation of the preferential trade agreement between Morocco and the United States of America. Following this study, the results showed that the rules of origin diminish substantially the efficiency of this Agreement and deprive Moroccan companies of the tax benefits in terms of access to the U.S. market. Therefore, they reflect protectionist practices in term of non tariff barriers. They take the form of manufacturing conditions hard to be met by the operators. The analysis of the relationship between preferential Moroccan exports to the United States of America, on one hand, and the presence of tariff preferences and the Rules of Origin, on the other hand, suggest that if the tariff preferences have indeed the effect of encouraging exports, the Rules of Origin have the reverse effect.