[ La stratégie d'assouplissement quantitatif des banques centrales face à la crise: Cas de la BCE et la FED ]
Volume 2, Issue 3, March 2013, Pages 216–229
Widad Choukairy1 and Nafii IBENRISSOUL2
1 Université Pierre Mendès, Grenoble, France
2 Laboratoire de management, d'innovation et d'économie LAMIE, Ecole nationale de commerce et de gestion ENCG, Université Hassan II Mohammedia, Casablanca, Morocco
Original language: French
Copyright © 2013 ISSR Journals. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The crisis has thrown the disorder on the effectiveness of the monetary policies. Indeed, the intensity of the financial crisis and the downward pressure it exerted on price stability has prompted many central banks to fix their interest rate at levels historically low. In September, the Federal Reserve conducts a decline in its rate to reach in December 2008, a floor close to zero, The Central Bank, for its part, has begun the process of falling interest rates in October 2008; which is continued until reaching a rate of 0.75% in July 2012. In a crisis, the fixation of the interest rate by the Central bank which is close to the 0% it is essential in order to stimulate economic activity, but, once the floor is reached, the risk of liquidity trap occurs, this leads monetary authorities to rethink their monetary policy and resort to others means of action other than further decline in interest rates. The purpose of this communication is to know whether the adoption by the central banks (European Central Bank and Federal Reserve case) of unconventional monetary policies, especially the policy of quantitative easing, has it enabled expansion of loans to households and finance companies, and therefore, contributed to an economic growth?
Author Keywords: Financial crisis, quantitative easing, liquidity trap.
Volume 2, Issue 3, March 2013, Pages 216–229
Widad Choukairy1 and Nafii IBENRISSOUL2
1 Université Pierre Mendès, Grenoble, France
2 Laboratoire de management, d'innovation et d'économie LAMIE, Ecole nationale de commerce et de gestion ENCG, Université Hassan II Mohammedia, Casablanca, Morocco
Original language: French
Copyright © 2013 ISSR Journals. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract
The crisis has thrown the disorder on the effectiveness of the monetary policies. Indeed, the intensity of the financial crisis and the downward pressure it exerted on price stability has prompted many central banks to fix their interest rate at levels historically low. In September, the Federal Reserve conducts a decline in its rate to reach in December 2008, a floor close to zero, The Central Bank, for its part, has begun the process of falling interest rates in October 2008; which is continued until reaching a rate of 0.75% in July 2012. In a crisis, the fixation of the interest rate by the Central bank which is close to the 0% it is essential in order to stimulate economic activity, but, once the floor is reached, the risk of liquidity trap occurs, this leads monetary authorities to rethink their monetary policy and resort to others means of action other than further decline in interest rates. The purpose of this communication is to know whether the adoption by the central banks (European Central Bank and Federal Reserve case) of unconventional monetary policies, especially the policy of quantitative easing, has it enabled expansion of loans to households and finance companies, and therefore, contributed to an economic growth?
Author Keywords: Financial crisis, quantitative easing, liquidity trap.
Abstract: (french)
La crise a jeté le trouble sur l'efficacité des politiques monétaires. En effet, l'intensité de la crise financière et la pression à la baisse qu'elle a exercée sur la stabilité des prix a incité bon nombre de banques centrales à fixer leur taux directeur à des niveaux (historiquement) bas. En septembre 2008, la FED procède à une baisse de son taux directeur pour atteindre en décembre 2008, un plancher proche de zéro, la BCE, quant à elle, a entamé son processus de baisse de taux directeurs en octobre 2008, lequel s'est poursuivi jusqu'à atteindre un taux de 0.75% en juillet 2012. Dans un contexte de crise, la fixation par la banque centrale d'un taux d'intérêt qui soit au voisinage du 0% lui est incontournable afin de pouvoir relancer l'activité économique, mais une fois ce taux plancher est atteint, le risque de (trappe à liquidité) intervient, ceci conduit les autorités monétaires à repenser leur politique monétaire et à recourir à d'autres moyens d'actions autres qu'une baisse supplémentaire du taux d'intérêt. L'objectif de cet article est de savoir si l'adoption par les banques centrales (Cas de la BCE et la FED) des politiques monétaires non conventionnelles, et plus particulièrement la stratégie d'assouplissement quantitatif a-t-elle permis une expansion de crédits accordés aux ménages et aux sociétés de financement, et en conséquence, a contribué à la croissance économique?
Author Keywords: Crise financière, Assouplissement quantitative, Quantitative Easing, trappe à liquidité.
How to Cite this Article
Widad Choukairy and Nafii IBENRISSOUL, “The quantitative easing strategy of the central banks facing the crisis: Case of the ECB (European Central Bank) and the FED (Federal Reserve System),” International Journal of Innovation and Applied Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 216–229, March 2013.
