This article is dedicated to the retrospective analysis of the mechanisms for drawing up public policy on wood resources, particularly for the artisanal exploitation of timber, from 2006 to 2016 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the light of the results obtained, during 11 years, 73% of the regulatory acts were taken against 18% of the political acts and 9% representing a legal act. This equates on average to 1 act per year. In short, as constructed, all these acts have been taken most spontaneously or following complex political agendas labeled as "opportunistic." Therefore, they weakly shape sustainable development from the established sector in study.
This article aims to understand the different relational configurations forming the backdrop of the artisanal timber sector in the Tshopo region in the Democratic Republic of Congo and their implications for sustainable local development. Thus, in terms of three types of relationships noted, namely coalitions, negotiations and conflicts, it is shown that this sector is dominated by weak links whose social capital is generally held by artisanal miners, modeled by the weak public policy. As a result, local development suffers as the rules of the game are much more strategic than impersonal.
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